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Abstract 
 
This essay provides an elementary, unified introduction to the models of market 
institutions that go beyond the competitive model of price-taking behavior on both sides 
of the market. Several models of market institutions that govern price determination are 
explored and compared, including contracting, posted prices, bilateral bargaining, 
middlemen, and auctions. While equilibrium models still do not capture the full 
possibilities for market behavior, modeling specific market institutions reduces the level 
of abstraction inherent in the standard competitive model. 
 
Keywords: market institutions; contracting; posted prices; bilateral bargaining; 
middlemen; auctions 
Introduction 
The standard competitive model makes two kinds of assumptions about competitive 
market institutions. First, price-taking behavior is literally that – both sides of the market 
assume that they can buy or sell what they wish at the prevailing market price. A market 
equilibrium is precisely a price (or prices in multiple markets) that ensures that aggregate 
plans of buyers and sellers are matched, so that each market participant can realize her 
plans. This assumption can be relaxed, to allow a richer set of contracts to be offered in 
the market. This possibility is alluded to at the end of Singh (2010a), in the context of an 
insurance market with asymmetric information, and we develop that case here. Models of 
contracting, especially in the context of uncertainty or asymmetric information, constitute 
an extensive literature. The distinction in this essay is to consider them in the context of 
different market institutions for price determination. Typically, textbook treatments (e.g., 
Kreps, 1990; Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Varian, 1992) group analyses by methodologies, 
rather than the idea of explaining a diverse range of institutions – hence the distinction of 
this essay is in its grouping of topics.1
 
A second, more significant assumption in the competitive model is that it abstracts 
entirely from the process of price determination. In a market with competitive buyers and 
sellers, everyone is a price-taker, and no one sets prices. Of course, it is well recognized 
that this is an abstraction – it just happens to be a very useful one for getting to the heart 
of the valuation and efficiency role of market-determined prices. At the same time, much 
thought has gone into building models in which there is a specific institutional 
mechanism for price determination. In some cases, the abstraction is pushed one level 
deeper, but is still there. In particular, equilibrium models still do not provide detailed 
analysis of behavior out of equilibrium and how exactly markets adjust to reach 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, the models provide insight into the details of market 
institutions, and how those details can matter for resource allocation and efficiency. 
Typically, these models are based on game theoretic approaches, but use assumptions that 
capture or approximate the impacts of competition (e.g., large numbers of market 
                                                 
1 A seminal survey of models of market organization, albeit with a very different focus, was Rothschild 
(1973). Singh (2010b) has some overlap with the focus of Rothschild’s survey. 
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participants). Examples of market institutions include posted prices (prices set by sellers), 
bargaining or negotiation, middlemen and auctions. 
 
Contracts 
A market equilibrium with contracts will be illustrated in the context of a simple 
insurance market model (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Singh, 2010a). The key feature of 
that market is an asymmetry of information about the risk level of individuals. This 
asymmetry makes expanding the space of market possibilities to include contracts worth 
considering. In the absence of the information asymmetry, one would not need contracts 
more complicated than agreements to buy or sell at the going price. In fact, the overall 
uncertainty in the insurance market (whether an individual will have an accident or not) is 
not an essential feature. For example, the same contracting possibilities would arise if an 
employer was contracting with employees – with output certain given ability – but ability 
was not observed by the employer.  Uncertainty could still play a role, however, in 
making it impossible to infer ability from output. 
 
To review the assumptions from Singh (2010a), there are two kinds of individuals, 
differing only in their probabilities of suffering a loss. However, market opportunities are 
no longer described by the ability to purchase any number of units of insurance, I, at a 
given price P. Instead, an insurance opportunity is described by a contract that specifies 
the total premium, R, and the total payout, I. An individual can choose to purchase the 
contract or not. Insurance companies will offer contracts, and in a competitive 
equilibrium, make zero expected profits.  
 
First consider the case of only one type of individual. She chooses the insurance contract 
if the following holds: 
 
  (1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )U R U d R I U U dπ ω π ω π ω π ω− + − − − + ≥ + − −
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The zero expected profit condition requires that 1(1 ) 0R Iπ− − = . Note that the implied 
price of insurance in this case is 1/ (1R I )π= − , as was the case with competitive 
insurance in Singh (2010a). Hence the left hand side of (1) becomes 
 
  (2) 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
( (1 ) ) (1 ) ( (1 ) )
( ) (1 ) ( )
U I U d I
U I I U d I
π ω π π ω π
π ω π π ω π
− − + − − − − +
= − + + − − +
I
I
 
Differentiating the last expression with respect to I yields 
 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
(1 )[ ( ) ( )]
U I I U d
U I I U d I
π π ω π π π ω π
π π ω π ω π
′ ′− − − + + − − +
′ ′= − − − + − − +  (3) 
 
By risk aversion, the marginal utility is decreasing in income and so the expression in 
square brackets is positive (negative) if ( )I d> < . Hence I d=  maximizes the left hand 
side of (1), and this would be the natural contract equilibrium with competitive insurance 
firms, i.e., * * 1( , ) ((1 ) , )R I π= − d d
1
. The individual obtains full insurance, not by choosing 
the amount of insurance at a market price per unit, but by choosing the insurance contract 
that prevails in the competitive market.  
 
Next, we turn to the case where there are two risk levels, such that 1H Lπ π< . If insurance 
companies observe risk types, then there can be a competitive equilibrium with two types 
of contracts, * * 1( , ) ((1 ) , )i i iR I π= − d d . Each type is restricted to the contract that is tailored 
for that type, and everyone gets full insurance in equilibrium. The outcome is again the 
same as in Singh (2010a), with full information about individuals’ risk levels.  
 
In Singh (2010a), we discussed what would happen if individual risk levels were not 
observable by insurance companies, so that all individuals would have to be offered the 
same price of insurance. In that case, there could be two types of competitive equilibria: 
(i) both types of individuals purchase insurance, at a price that would average the 
probabilities of loss across the two risk levels; (ii) only high-risk individuals would 
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purchase insurance, at a price reflecting only their own loss probabilities, with low-risk 
individuals choosing to purchase no insurance. The second equilibrium arises when the 
extra cost of insuring high-risk individuals makes insurance too expensive for the low-
risk types. 
 
We now investigate when it is possible that there might be two types of contracts, such 
that the equilibrium is better in some sense than one or both of the above equilibria. The 
possibility of specifying the total amount of insurance purchased in a contract creates this 
new possibility. If only prices can be specified in the market, then any buyer of insurance 
would choose the lower price. However, if a lower price comes with less coverage, 
different buyers might have different rankings of contracts available in the marketplace. 
 
Therefore, we are looking for two contracts, ( , ), ( , )L L H HR I R I , such that low risk 
individuals would prefer the first contract, and high-risk individuals would prefer the 
second contract. This implies two inequalities must hold simultaneously: 
 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) (
( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) (
L L L L L
L H L H
H H H H H
)
)
H
H L H L
U R U d R I
U R U d R I
U R U d R I
U R U d R I
π ω π ω
π ω π ω
π ω π ω
π ω π ω
− + − − − + ≥
− + − − − +
− + − − − + ≥
− + − − − + L
 (4) 
 
These are called the self-selection or incentive compatibility constraints, in a contract 
equilibrium with asymmetric information. We must also note that choosing the contracts 
must be better for individuals of either type than not purchasing insurance at all. This 
requirement gives us the following two acceptance constraints, which are the analogues 
of (1) for the case of two risk levels. 
 
  (5) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
L L L L L L L
H H H H H H H
U R U d R I U U d
U R U d R I U U d
π ω π ω π ω π ω
π ω π ω π ω π ω
− + − − − + ≥ + − −
− + − − − + ≥ + − −
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Now we impose the condition that expected profits are zero for each type of contract. 
This is what we might expect with competition among insurance firms. Therefore, 
1(1 ) 0, ,i i iR I i Lπ− − = = H
, H
)
. This means that the expected utility with an insurance 
purchase has the form . It also 
implies that the acceptance constraints will not be binding, so we can focus on the self-
selection constraints. 
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 ) ( ),i i i i i i iU I I U d I i Lπ ω π π ω π− + + − − + =
 
Intuitively, the restriction imposed by the self-selection constraints will work as follows. 
Suppose that the full-insurance contracts that would work with the risk levels being 
observable were known were offered. The low-risk individual would not be interested in 
, since it offers worse terms for the insurance. On the other hand, the high 
risk individual would always choose the contract  over the contract 
.  Hence, intuitively, the first of the self-selection constraints will not be 
binding, and the only restriction we are left with is  
1((1 ) , )H d dπ−
1((1 ) , )L d dπ−
1((1 ) , )H d dπ−
 
 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
( (1 ) ) (1 ) ( (1 ) )
( (1 ) ) (1 ) (
H H H H
H L L H L L
U d U
U I U d
π ω π π ω π
π ω π π ω π
− − + − − −
= − − + − − +
d
I
)d
 (6) 
 
This says that the high-risk type must be indifferent between the two market insurance 
contracts in the competitive equilibrium. The left hand side is the expected utility from 
the full insurance contract, and just reduces to . The right hand side is 
what the high-risk type would get by choosing , the contract meant for the 
low-risk type. The latter still has fair odds, but the quantity will be restricted, so that 
, i.e., the low-risk type ends up with less than full insurance. This is how the 
quantity restriction comes into play in the contract offerings, versus the usual competitive 
price-taking assumption that any amount can be bought and sold at the going market 
price. 
1 1( (1 )HU ω π− −
1((1 ) ), )L L LI Iπ−
LI d<
 
 5
The idea that there is an equilibrium set of contracts in a competitive market generalizes 
the usual notion of an equilibrium price or set of prices. It does not require that either side 
of the market sets prices, nor that there is any market power that results from price setting. 
In that sense, the institutions of the market remain an abstraction. One could posit, in the 
above model, that insurance firms decide what contracts to offer. Formally, the 
equilibrium notion shifts from a price/contract equilibrium (is there a set of 
prices/contracts such that supply equals demand?) to a Nash equilibrium in firms’ choices 
of prices/contracts. We turn next to price-setting equilibria. 
 
Posted Prices2
A posted price is a price set by a firm, at which it is willing to sell. This is by far the most 
common institution for retail markets. Goods are on shelves or in catalogues, with 
marked prices, and the seller implicitly agrees to sell whatever it has available at that 
price. Services are also typically made available with prices publicly announced or 
provided to a prospective buyer on enquiry.  
 
As the Bertrand model shows, price setting of this form does not imply market power. 
Even if there are just two price-setting sellers of a homogeneous good, the outcome can 
be one where the good is priced at marginal cost, i.e., the competitive price. However, the 
equilibrium can be very sensitive to the exact nature of the posting, and when consumers 
learn the price. In the Bertrand model, buyers know all firms’ prices, and can shift 
costlessly and instantly to a firm that offers a lower price. This is what makes 
undercutting profitable if a firm’s price is above marginal cost, and what drives price to 
marginal cost in equilibrium.  
 
Instead, suppose that prices are posted only in the sense that a potential buyer can observe 
the price when she visits or contacts the seller, the price is fixed, and it is accompanied by 
an offer to supply the buyer’s demand at that price. Suppose also that the potential buyer 
incurs a cost if she does not buy after learning the offer. This may be a physical or 
monetary cost of visiting or contacting another seller, or a time cost of delay in 
                                                 
2 The model and analysis in this section are taken from Riley and Zeckhauser (1980). 
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purchasing. The buyer’s search is sequential, but does not follow an optimal dynamic 
strategy, in the sense that the buyer does not estimate a distribution of prices and update it 
based on observation. In this model, the equilibrium price turns out to be the monopoly 
price, no matter how small is the buyer’s search cost. So making these changes in what 
buyers know and how they act without perfect knowledge pushes the equilibrium form 
one polar case (the competitive price) to the other (the monopoly price). 
 
The rough argument for the result is as follows. Suppose that there are n sellers, and 
( )N p buyers in the market with reservation price less than or equal to p . With identical 
sellers of a homogeneous good, in equilibrium the number of buyers for each seller will 
be 1 ( )N p
n
. The demand function that each seller faces will be 1 ( ) ( )N p D p
n
, and its 
profit (assuming constant unit cost of c) will be 1 ( ) ( )( )N p D p p c
n
− . Now if potential 
buyers face a cost of going somewhere else, then there should be an 0ε >  such that 
buyers will still purchase from this seller rather than going somewhere else, so 
that ( ) ( )N p N p ε= + . In that case, the seller needs only to maximize ( )( )D p p c− . But 
that means choosing the monopoly price, so the equilibrium price must be the monopoly 
price, * mp p= . 
 
In fact, one can vary the assumptions so that neither the competitive price nor the 
monopoly price is the equilibrium price, in this posted price setting. There can be a single 
equilibrium price between the two polar cases, or even a distribution of prices, despite 
there being a homogeneous good. The nature of information, of how information is 
acquired, and how it is disseminated can all affect the predicted outcome. In a sense, the 
chief lesson of these models is that the nature of a posted price equilibrium is very 
sensitive to the detailed structure of market institutions. 
 
One issue we have taken for granted in the above discussion is that there is no alternative 
to a posted price – only its level has been in question. However, one can also ask why a 
potential buyer, when faced with a high price offer, cannot make a counter offer, or, more 
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importantly, why a seller would not entertain any such counter offers. In the case of a 
large complex organization, the answer can be found in transaction costs relative to the 
price of a good. It may make sense for a car salesperson to bargain in such a manner, but 
not for a grocery store clerk. We treat bargaining more explicitly in the next section, but 
first introduce a model in which the decision to choose a posted price is endogenous – the 
seller optimally refuses to shade the price offer.  
 
Consider a situation where a series of buyers enter the seller’s store until a sale is made: 
there is just a single unit to be sold. Buyers have no costs of waiting or negotiating, and 
they care only about the difference between their reservation value and the price they pay. 
The seller maximizes her expected profit. A key assumption is that the seller is able to 
commit to a strategy, and that each buyer knows this. Also, the seller does not know any 
given buyer’s reservation price, but knows the distribution of reservation prices over 
potential buyers. If the seller knew the buyer’s reservation price, she would just wait for 
the buyer with the highest reservation price, ask for that price and not budge.  
 
We now sketch the argument for why the seller will choose fixed prices in this situation. 
Let S denote any contingent pricing strategy of the seller. For example, S might say that if 
she is turned down at a price of p1, she quotes a new price of p2 with probability 0.5 and 
requests a new buyer with probability 0.5. A seller with reservation price v has some 
optimal response to this strategy, denoted by bS(v). The seller’s strategy and buyer’s 
response together determine an implied probability of sale and expected price, as follows: 
 
 
( ) ( ( ))
( ) ( ( ))
S S
S S
H v H b v
p v p b v
≡
≡  (7) 
 
The seller uses the probability of sale function in calculating expected profit of a current 
customer versus a future potential buyer. The key step in the argument examines the 
difference between the two gains, weighted by H(v). Since this difference over possible 
intervals of v will be either positive or negative, it turns out that the seller’s optimal 
strategy is given by 
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*
*
*
0,
( )
1,
v v
H v
v v
⎧ <⎪= ⎨ ≥⎪⎩
 (8) 
 
Mathematically, the seller solves a control problem which has a bang-bang solution. The 
intuition is that if there is a greater profit to be made by selling to a buyer with a 
particular valuation versus waiting, then it should be done for sure. Furthermore, there is 
a specific cutoff of valuations below which it is always better to wait. The cutoff value  
is the take-it-or-leave-it fixed price. 
*v
 
Bargaining 
The last model of the previous section allowed for bargaining, but in a somewhat abstract 
way. Furthermore, it turned out that bargaining was not an equilibrium, even when it was 
possible. The idea was to show that posted prices might emerge as an endogenous choice 
from a wider range of pricing options. In practice, bargaining does occur, and this section 
explores some ways of modeling the bargaining process. 
 
The simplest bargaining model assumes perfect information, and an intuitive bargaining 
protocol: the players make alternating offers.3 One player starts with an offer. If the other 
accepts, the bargaining is over and the deal is concluded. If the second player rejects, he 
gets to make an offer, in which case player 1 can accept or reject, and so on. We also 
assume that there is just a single unit to be bought and sold. Suppose that the buyer’s 
valuation is v, while the seller’s is 0. A transaction price p therefore assigns surplus p to 
the seller and v – p to the buyer. Essentially, therefore, bargaining over the transaction 
price reduces to bargaining over splitting the fixed surplus v. Player 1 can be the seller or 
buyer in this case. 
 
                                                 
3 This is the famous Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model, with the treatment here, as in textbooks, being 
influenced heavily by Shaked and Sutton (1984). 
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This bargaining model also assumes that there are some costs of bargaining, in the form 
of time discounting. Each offer takes up a period, and the payoffs in the next period are 
discounted by a factor (0,1)δ ∈ , which is the same for both buyer and seller. The period 
can be as small a time interval as we like, and the discount factor can therefore be as 
close to one as we like. 
 
First suppose that there is a finite amount of time available for bargaining, say T periods. 
Then the bargaining game can be solved by backward induction. If T is odd, then player 1 
makes the last offer, assuming that no agreement has been reached previously. Since 
there is no advantage to rejecting an offer, player 2 should accept any offer, as low as v2 = 
0. Hence the payoffs are . 1( ,0T vδ − )
)v
 
In period T – 1, however, player 2 gets to make the offer. Player 1 should accept any 
offer that provides at least , since that is what she can get by rejecting and having 
the chance to make a final offer in period T. This is therefore what player 2 offers in 
period T – 1, and the payoffs are . Compared to the last period, 
player 2 has less bargaining power because player 1 now has the option of rejecting and 
getting to make a final take-it-or-leave-it offer. Still, player 2 has some bargaining power 
from being the one to make the offer. 
1T vδ −
1 2 1( ,T T Tv vδ δ δ− − −−
 
Continuing with this backward induction, we can see that the unique Subgame Perfect 
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of this alternating offer bargaining game is where player 1 
makes an offer in period 1, it is accepted, and the payoff to player 1 is: 
 
 
* 2
1 ( ) [1 ... ]
1
1
T
T
v T v
v
δ δ δ
δ
δ
1−= − + − +
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 (9) 
 
Player 2’s equilibrium payoff is therefore . If player 1 is the seller, then 
the equilibrium sales price in this situation is 
*
2 ( ) ( )v T v v T= − *1
* *
1 ( )p v T= . One can check that player 1 
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gets a greater share of the surplus in this equilibrium. This reflects two advantages: she 
gets to make the first offer, and she would get to make the last offer, if that situation arose. 
 
If the number of time periods approaches infinity, then the bargaining equilibrium 
approaches  
 
 ,
1 1
v vδ
δ δ
⎛⎜ + +⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  (10) 
 
In this case, the advantage of making a last offer goes away, since there is no last period, 
but there is still an advantage to making the first offer, and so player 1 still gets more than 
half of the surplus. Again, if player 1 is the seller, the equilibrium sales price is 
*
1
vp δ= + . 
 
The case of T being even can be worked out using the analysis already performed. This is 
because after one period, with no agreement in period 1, the subgame is one of T – 1 
periods, where T – 1 is odd, but player 2 is making the initial offer in this subgame. 
Hence, player 2 gets , leaving *1 ( 1v Tδ − ) )*1 ( 1v v Tδ− − for player 1. This amount is 
explicitly  
 
 
2 2
2 1
[1 ... ]
[1 ... ]
1
1
T
T
T
v v
v
v
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
δ
δ
−
−
− − + − +
= − + − −
⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 (11) 
 
Now player 1 gets somewhat less than in the case where she makes the last offer, since 
player 2 would be in a monopoly position at the last bargaining stage, if that were to be 
reached. Even though the last period of bargaining is never reached in equilibrium, its 
anticipation filters through to the equilibrium through the backward induction process. 
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Note that, if the number of periods approaches infinity, the solution to the case with an 
even number of periods is identical to that with an odd number of periods. The last-period 
effect goes away, leaving only the impact of the advantage of making the first offer. It 
also turns out that the equilibrium split of the surplus in (10) is the unique equilibrium of 
a game where there is no last period. This does not automatically follow from taking the 
limit of the finite-T equilibrium, since that was derived using backward induction. 
However, an alternative argument based on the stationarity of the game (similar to what 
was used to go from the odd-period to even-period case) can be used to derive the result. 
 
The striking feature of the alternate-offer bargaining model is that agreement is reached 
immediately, and there is no delay. Delay would imply inefficiency, since there is a time 
cost of waiting to complete the transaction. A key assumption in ensuring immediate 
agreement is that both parties know the valuations of the good – there is no asymmetry of 
information. As a result, the bargaining process in practice is trivial. 
 
There are many ways of introducing incomplete information that leads to delays in 
agreement. A simple model is presented here, due to Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). It 
assumes that the seller does not know the buyer’s positive valuation, which can be high 
( Hv ) or low ( ), but knows that each is equally likely. Assume again that the seller’s 
valuation is zero, and this is known to the buyer. Also, the seller is the only one to make 
offers – the buyer cannot make counter-offers, only accept or reject the seller’s offer. The 
model has only two periods. The seller therefore chooses offers to make in each period, 
Lv
1p  and 2p .  The buyer may reject the first period offer, either because his valuation is 
low, or because he thinks he can get a lower offer in the second period. The seller, on the 
other hand, does not want to always price low initially to ensure an immediate sale, 
because that may involve losing some potential surplus if the buyer has a high valuation. 
Thus, the model captures some essential features of bargaining. 
 
For simplicity, we focus on the case where . In a one period case, the seller 
would therefore offer , which is accepted with certainty. The alternative of offering 
/ 2L Hv v>
Lv Hv  
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would be accepted only half the time, with an expected payoff of , which is lower 
by assumption. In the two-period case, if the second period has been reached, then the 
seller’s posterior probability estimate that the buyer’s valuation is  is at least half, so 
the second-period price offer must be 
/ 2Hv
Lv
*
2 Lp v= . 
 
In the first period, the low value buyer will not pay more than , but the high value 
buyer has a higher reservation price. However, this price is less than 
Lv
Hv , because he can 
get a lower price by waiting. At the same time, waiting has a cost, captured in the buyer’s 
discount factor, Bδ . Hence the acceptance condition for a high value buyer is 
 
 1 ( )H B H Lv p v vδ− ≥ −  (12) 
 
This implies that the maximum first period price is  
 
 1 (1 )B L B Hp v vδ δ= + −  (13) 
 
If the seller chooses this price in period 1, her expected profit is 
 
 1 [ (1 ) ]
2 2B L B H S L
v v 1 vδ δ+ − + δ  (14) 
 
On the other hand, the seller could just charge  and get that amount as a sure gain. The 
condition for the higher price being an equilibrium is therefore given by 
Lv
 
 
1 1[ (1 ) ] ,
2 2
(1 ) (2 )
B L B H S L L
B H B S L
v v v v
v v
δ δ δ
δ δ δ
+ − + ≥
− ≥ − −
or
 (15) 
 
 13
Given the earlier requirement that , this cannot hold if the discount factors are 
equal for the buyer and seller, but is possible if the seller is sufficiently more patient than 
the buyer. The condition for that to hold is 
2 Lv v> H
L
 
 [ ( ) 2 ] /S B H L L Hv v v v vδ δ≥ − + −  (16) 
 
Since the seller’s discount factor cannot exceed one, a further necessary condition is 
1 [ ( ) 2 ] /B H L L H Lv v v v vδ≥ − + − , but this is automatically satisfied when the buyer’s 
discount factor does not exceed one. 
 
To summarize, if the seller is sufficiently more patient than the buyer, the equilibrium is  
 
 * *1 2( , ) ( (1 ) , )B L B H Lp p v vδ δ= + − v
H
 (17) 
 
In this equilibrium, a high value buyer will accept immediately, while a low value buyer 
will reject initially, and accept the second period offer.  
 
In the case worked out here, the good is always sold. There is some inefficiency from the 
delay, as the low value buyer has to wait one period. There is also a distributional effect 
from the asymmetric information (a positive externality from the low value to the high 
value buyer), in the sense that the high value buyer gets a lower price than would be 
possible in the absence of the low value buyer. Suppose instead that . Again, 
there can be delay. Furthermore, there is some chance that the transaction may not occur 
at all, which implies greater inefficiency. This case is more complicated, so we do not 
work it out here. The intuition, however, is that the greater relative value of the high 
value buyer makes the seller act tougher in her offers, which also leads to the possibility 
of no agreement. 
2 Lv v≤
 
 14
Middlemen 
Models of bargaining typically focus on the details of bargaining protocols, and how 
those affect equilibrium outcomes. Bargaining models can also be embedded in market 
contexts, where buyers and sellers search for each other and negotiate while conscious of 
the presence of other options that might be discovered. In this essay we are not focusing 
on these search technologies, though they also affect price formation. Instead, we are 
focusing on the institutions that govern the terms of the transaction. With this in mind, we 
turn next to looking at the role of middlemen or intermediaries. Middlemen economize on 
search for buyers and sellers, so their role is tied in to the existence of search alternatives. 
We begin with the simplest case, however, where buyers and sellers must come to a 
middleman, before discussing what happens when there is an alternative of searching for 
direct transactions. 
 
We assume that there are many buyers and many sellers, as follows.4 There is a single 
indivisible good which is consumed in one unit quantities only. Buyers have reservation 
prices, v, which are distributed uniformly on [0,1]. Sellers have reservation values w, also 
uniformly distributed on the unit interval. A buyer’s utility from paying a price p is 
. The traditional market demand function is ( )BU v v p= − ( ) 1D p p= − , assuming 
. A seller’s net utility from receiving price p is 0 p≤ ≤1 ( )SU w p w= − . The traditional 
market supply function is . Reservation values are private information, known 
only to each individual. A traditional market equilibrium would be one where supply 
equals demand, or p* = ½. Recall that traditional theory provides no explanation of how 
this price is reached. 
( )S p p=
 
Suppose that traders can only go to a middleman who quotes fixed bid and ask prices, 
bp and ap . These prices are publicly observed by the whole market (posted prices). If the 
intermediary attracts  buyers and  sellers, then its profit is  Bq Sq
 
                                                 
4 The model presented here is due to Gehrig (1993). Alternative models of intermediaries that yield 
different outcomes include Spulber (1996a, 1996b). 
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 min{ , }( )B S a bq q p pπ = −  (18) 
 
The expression captures the possibility that one side of the market may be rationed – 
some buyers or sellers will not be able to transact. 
 
Intuitively, the middleman will set the bid and ask prices symmetrically around the 
competitive equilibrium. This can be proved formally, but we will assume this, so that the 
number of buyers and sellers is equal. Hence Bq qS=  and 1a bp p= − . The middleman’s 
profit is therefore given by 
 
 (1 ) (1 2 )b b b b bp p p p pπ = − − = −  (19) 
 
By calculating the maximum of this function it is easy to see that  * 1
4b
p =  and so * 3
4a
p = . 
Substituting into the demand or supply function, we see that the equilibrium quantity is 
* 1
4
q = . 
 
In this situation, the monopolist is a traditional monopolist with respect to buyers, but 
also acts as a monopsonist with respect to sellers. The middleman’s profit comes solely 
from being the only channel for buyers and sellers to transact. In the above model, if 
there are two competing intermediaries, then the equilibrium essentially reduces to a 
Bertrand equilibrium, or p* = ½. The logic of the argument is essentially the same as for 
the case of two price-setting sellers, except it now applies on both sides of the market. 
 
Another possibility is that, even with one middleman, competition can come from buyers 
and sellers searching and finding each other. This possibility is now described, and its 
implications for the middleman’s equilibrium worked out.  Therefore, suppose that 
buyers and sellers are matched at random as they search. To keep matters very simple, 
assume that buyers and sellers always find each other (rather than buyers finding other 
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buyers, or sellers other sellers). When a buyer and seller are matched, one of them at 
random gets to make a take-it-or-leave it offer. Rejection results on no trade taking place. 
 
Because there is the alternative of going to the middleman, the distributions of buyers and 
sellers who search may not be the entire distributions. Denote the distribution of 
searching buyers by and of searching sellers by . Buyers and sellers also 
have bid or ask strategies, denoted by  and .  We will assume that these 
strategies are strictly increasing functions of the reservation values. Hence, we have the 
following expected utility expressions for buyers and sellers, where the first term is the 
case where that person bids, and the other is where the counterparty bids. 
( )BF v ( )SF w
( )b v ( )a w
 
 
1
1
( ) ( )
0 0
1 1
( ) ( )
1 1( ) [ ( )] ( ) [ ( )] ( )
2 2
1 1( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ] (
2 2
b v a v
B S
S Ba w b w
U v v b v dF w v a w dF w
U w a w w dF v b v w dF v
−
−
= − + −
= − + −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ )
S
B
 (20) 
 
For the buyer, the expectation is over types of sellers. If the buyer bids, the first part of 
the integrand is independent of the seller’s valuation. If the seller asks, the asking price 
depends on the seller’s valuation. The buyer’s bid is accepted if the seller’s valuation is 
below the bid, giving the seller nonnegative utility. The seller’s ask is accepted if the 
buyer’s valuation is above the asking price. The logic is similar for the components of the 
seller’s expected utility. 
 
We now argue that the distributions of buyers and sellers who search have a simple form. 
First, note that buyers who search face the risk of meeting a seller with a high valuation 
and not being able to complete the deal. On the other hand, buying from the intermediary 
avoids this risk, but at a cost of paying a possible premium to the middleman. Suppose a 
buyer with valuation v0 prefers searching to going to the middleman. Then any buyer 
with a lower valuation could imitate the v0 strategy and also do better with search. A 
detailed proof is involved, but the intuition is that imitating the higher valuation buyer 
gives some advantage with respect to price in the search market, but not in dealing with 
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the intermediary, who charges the same price regardless. Hence, the set of buyers going 
to the intermediary will be those with valuations in an interval of the form ( ,1]v . 
Furthermore, buyers with low enough valuations will not even bother to search, since 
they would not even be served in a perfect competitive market. Hence the distribution of 
buyers who search is uniform on an interval of the form [ , ]v v . Similar arguments imply 
that the distribution of sellers who search is uniform on an interval of the form [ , ]w w , 
with those above this interval not searching, and those below choosing to go to the 
middleman. Roughly, the intermediary is the better option for those who have the most to 
gain from completing a transaction, because it avoids the possible failure that can occur 
in search. 
 
Now we derive the buyer’s and seller’s bid and ask strategies. The part of the buyer’s 
expected utility that she can control is given by  
 
 
( ) ( )
0
1[ ( )] ( ) [ ( )]
b v b v
S w
v b v dF w v b v dw
v w
− = −−∫ ∫  (21) 
 
The denominator in the integrand is the range of agents that are active in search. The 
integral is a simple quadratic function in b, and the maximum is given by 
 
 *( ) ( ) / 2b v v w= +  (22) 
 
A similar chain of reasoning gives the seller’s optimal ask function, which is 
 
 *( ) ( ) / 2a w w v= +  (23) 
 
Using these bid and ask functions, we can write the buyer’s expected utility as 
 
 
( )/2 21 ( ) 1 [ ( ) / 2]( )
2 2( ) 2 ( )
v w v v
B w w
v w v w vU v dw dw
v w v w
+ −− − += +− −∫ ∫  (24) 
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At the cutoff level v , this simplifies to ( ) /v w 4− . The borderline seller’s utility is 
identical. 
 
This utility value puts a limit on the price that the middleman can charge. The utility for 
this marginal buyer, indifferent between searching and going to the intermediary, is 
( av p− ) . Equating the two utility expressions, we have 
 
 3 1 3 1 3 1(1 )
4 4 4 4 4 2a
p v w w w= + = − + = − w
b
 (25) 
 
The second equality exploits the symmetry of the distributions of buyers and sellers. We 
will rewrite the expression as the cutoff seller valuation in terms of the ask price. 
Furthermore, we will use the symmetry of the ask and bid price around ½, so that 
1ap p= − . Hence we have the following expressions for profit: 
 
 3( ) ( 2 )(2
2a b a a
w p p p pπ = − = − −1)  (26) 
 
The maximum of this with respect to pa is easily calculated to be 5/8. Hence, the bid price 
pb to buyers is 3/8. The volume of transactions is still ¼, as in the monopoly case, but the 
presence of the alternative reduces the market power of the intermediary. 
 
The above model is just one example of price-setting by active intermediaries. The key 
idea is that imperfect alternatives to using a monopoly middleman can limit the 
intermediary’s market power. The result that with two middlemen market power goes 
away entirely is a special one however, and is sensitive to the specification of the 
matching and search process. In general, competition among intermediaries will reduce 
the bid-ask spread, but not eliminate it entirely. 
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Auctions 
Auctions are another variation on institutions used to determine the terms of a transaction. 
We have examined various institutions for price determination, differentiated by the 
assumptions about the nature of competition and the information available to participants. 
The simplest example of an auction is when there is a single unit of a good, a single seller, 
and two potential buyers. For the auction institution to make sense, or be interesting, it 
should provide some advantage to the seller. This arises when the seller does not know 
buyer valuations. In that case, competition between the potential buyers through bidding 
in the auction benefits the seller.  
 
Even within this simple class of cases, there can be many variations in the details of 
institutional design, with respect to the rules of bidding, constraints on participation, and 
assumptions about the relationship of buyer valuations. We illustrate the simplest case 
again, where buyer valuations are independent (and hence uncorrelated), there is no entry 
condition or participation fee, and bids are made through a simultaneous sealed-bid 
method. This latter assumption contrasts with the more popular method of repeated open 
bidding, as featured in art auctions, or in its electronic form on eBay. 
 
Suppose that buyer valuations, denoted by  and , are drawn independently from the 
same distribution.
1v 2v
5 To keep matters simple, let this distribution be uniform on [0,1]. Both 
buyers and the seller know this fact (and, more strongly, it is common knowledge), but 
only the buyer knows his own valuation. The seller’s valuation is zero, so there are 
potential gains to completing the auction successfully. 
 
Let denote the bid made by buyer i. The first auction institution we consider is where 
the highest bidder wins, and pays that winning bid to complete the transaction. The 
winning bid is therefore the transaction price for the good being auctioned.  
ib
 
It is convenient to assume that buyers use strategies of the form  
                                                 
5 The following treatment of auctions is standard, and very similar to that presented in Mas-Colell et al. 
(1995). 
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  for [0,1]i i i ib k v k= ∈  (27) 
 
This reduces the choice of strategies from the more complicated problem of picking a 
function of the valuation to picking the parameter . Consider buyer 1’s expected utility 
maximization problem, when buyer 2 chooses a strategy of the above form: 
ik
 
 
1 0 1 1 2 2 1
( ) ( ( )b )Max v b Prob b v b≥ − ≤  (28) 
 
The first term is the gain in utility from winning the auction. The second term is the 
probability of winning, i.e., the probability of outbidding buyer 2. Since bids are 
submitted simultaneously, buyer 1 has to estimate what buyer 2’s bid will be – he cannot 
observe the rival’s bid. Using the strategy functional form in (27), the condition for 
winning is . At the same time, buyer 1’s bid should never exceed , since 
this is the maximum that buyer 2 will ever bid. Buyer 1’s problem is therefore 
2 1 2( / )v b k≤ 2k
 
 
2 1 0 1 1 1 2
( )( /k b )Max v b b k≥ ≥ −  (29) 
 
The solution is  
 
 11 1 1 22( ) min{ , }b v v k=  (30) 
In other words, 11 2k = as long as  is not too small. 2k
 
By similar reasoning, using the symmetry of the buyers,  
 
 12 2 2 12( ) min{ , }b v v k=  (31) 
 
It is easy to see now that 11 2 2k k= =  yields a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the bidding 
game between the two buyers. In other words, the equilibrium strategies are defined by  
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  12( )i i ib v v=  (32) 
 
Each buyer only bids one-half of his valuation in this equilibrium. The intuition is as 
follows. Bidding one’s valuation increases the chance of winning the auction, but reduces 
the surplus from acquiring the good. Hence it makes sense to shade one’s bid. In the case 
of the uniform distribution of valuations, this shading is precisely half of the true 
valuation. The buyer with the higher valuation will always win the auction. The seller’s 
revenue from this equilibrium is 1 11 22 2max{ , }v v . Expected revenue therefore is given by 
 
 2
2
1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 22 20 0
( )
v
I v
E R v dv v dv dv⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  (33) 
 
The double integration takes account of the seller’s uncertainty about both buyers’ 
valuations. The independence of valuations is reflected in the independent distribution 
functions. The first interior integral captures possibilities where buyer 1 has the higher 
valuation and higher (winning) bid, the second where buyer 2 wins.  This expression can 
be evaluated, and turns out to be 1/3. If the seller knew buyer valuations, she could 
extract the entire surplus from the winning bidder through competition, and the expected 
revenue would be ½ (the mean of the distribution of either valuation). Hence the seller’s 
lack of perfect knowledge of buyer valuations limits her market power to some extent.  
 
Now consider a variation of the above auction. Suppose it is still a sealed-bid auction, 
and the highest bid wins, but now the winning bidder only pays an amount equal to the 
second-highest bid. This kind of auction is called a second-price auction (the previous 
one being a first-price auction). This method of determining the transaction price does 
away with any incentive that buyers might have to shade their bids. Therefore, the 
equilibrium bidding strategies now have the form ( )i i ib v v= . This is the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium of the bidding game between the buyers. In fact, the strategies in this case are 
weakly dominant (stronger than a Bayesian Nash equilibrium). The buyer with the higher 
valuation always wins, and this probability is ½, by symmetry. 
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 The seller’s expected revenue in this case is given by the expression: 
 
 2
2
1 1
2 1 1 1 20 0
( )
v
II v
E R v dv v dv dv⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  (34) 
 
It is important to see that, in comparing this with previous revenue expression, the 
coefficients of ½ have disappeared, but the valuations have also switched their places in 
the integrals. The bids are higher, but the seller gets lower payments since she gets only 
the second-highest bid. If we evaluate the integral, it turns out to be 1/3 again. This is not 
a coincidence. The equality is a special case or illustration of the revenue equivalence 
theorem. The key assumptions of the theorem are risk neutral buyers with independent 
valuations drawn from the same distribution. Then if two auctions give the lowest 
valuation buyer the same expected utility, and probabilities of winning are the same for 
the same vector of realized valuations, then the seller’s expected revenue must be equal 
across the auctions.  
 
As noted earlier, there are many variations of basic auction institutions, and assumptions 
and outcomes can differ. The general lesson to take away is that auctions can use 
competition among potential buyers to extract more revenue from the eventual buyer than 
might be possible in a bilateral bargaining situation. It is also possible that sellers 
compete as well. Two potential sellers might simultaneously run auctions for two 
potential buyers. This would tend to increase the leverage of buyers. On the other hand, if 
the sellers’ valuations are positive and unknown, the buyers might risk not getting the 
item at all – this could increase the market power of the sellers. In sum, many 
complications in market institutions can be envisaged, with the competitive model of 
price-taking behavior providing a benchmark for all of them. 
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